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A fine line exists between a State limiting the people’s right to 
bear arms and infringing upon that right. The Second Amendment 
provides, “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 
infringed,”1 and yet a State may limit this right through legislation.2 
The extent to which state governments may push the boundaries, 
however, is not clear.3 Recently, in Illinois, the government regulated 
the concealed carrying of firearms by enacting the Illinois Firearm 
Concealed Carry Act.4 Under the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry 
Act, the government only allows a nonresident to apply for a 
concealed carry license in Illinois if the nonresident lives in a state 
with licensing standards “substantially similar” to those of Illinois and 
has a concealed carry license in the state where they reside.5 Illinois 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2020, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Recording Industry Studies, Butler University, 2017. Thank 
you to my family and friends for their constant support, and to Hal Morris and 
Eva Dickey for helping guide me through my legal writing process. 
1 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
2 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 784–85 (2010). 
3 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2011). 
4 Culp v. Raoul, 921 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2019) [hereinafter Culp II]. 
5 Id. at 648-649. 
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considers only four out of fifty states to qualify as having 
“substantially similar” concealed carry licensing standards: Arkansas, 
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia.6  
In Culp v. Raoul, nonresidents who held concealed carry licenses 
in their home states challenged the constitutionality of the substantial 
similarity provision of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act.7 The 
Seventh Circuit found the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act 
“respects the Second Amendment without offending the anti-
discrimination principle at the heart of Article IV’s Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.”8 Although Plaintiffs urged the Seventh Circuit to 
apply a standard of strict scrutiny, the court was correct not to evaluate 
the constitutionality of the substantial similarity requirement under a 
strict scrutiny standard.9  
The Seventh Circuit followed the district court decision and 
applied intermediate scrutiny because the law burdens, but does not 
ban the Second Amendment right to carry guns outside of the home.10 
The Seventh Circuit recognizes intermediate scrutiny as a sliding 
scale, allowing the court to apply a traditional form of intermediate 
scrutiny or a more rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny.11 The more 
rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny is known as “elevated 
intermediate scrutiny.”12 The test for elevated intermediate scrutiny is 
harder to pass than traditional intermediate scrutiny, but easier to pass 
than strict scrutiny.13 Although the Seventh Circuit applied 
intermediate scrutiny rather than strict scrutiny, the court failed to use 
the correct form of intermediate scrutiny.14  The court should have 
                                                 
6 Id. at 651. 
7 Id. at 652. 
8 Id. at 649. 
9 Id. at 653-654. 
10 See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655; Culp v. Madigan, 270 F. Supp. 3d 1038, 1054 
(C.D. Ill. 2017) [hereinafter Culp I]. 
11 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
12 People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (1st) 153373, ¶ 26. 
13 See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 878 (4th Cir. 2013); Ezell, 651 
F.3d at 708; Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 530 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
14 Culp I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 1054; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
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applied elevated intermediate scrutiny rather than traditional 
intermediate scrutiny.15 
Because the Seventh Circuit in Culp failed to adopt a standard of 
elevated intermediate scrutiny, the court failed to properly analyze the 
substantial similarity requirement of the Illinois Firearm Concealed 
Carry Act.16 As a result, the Seventh Circuit was incorrect in finding 
the substantial similarity requirement of the Act was constitutional.17 
The substantial similarity requirement of the Illinois Firearm 
Concealed Carry Act fails the rigorous review of elevated intermediate 
scrutiny because the substantial similarity requirement is not a close fit 
between the government’s means and its end. Thus, the substantial 
similarity requirement is unconstitutional, and Illinois is overextending 
its ability to limit people’s right to bear arms by not amending the 
substantial similarity requirement of the Illinois Firearm Concealed 
Carry Act.18 
First, this Note will provide a background regarding the history 
and role of self-defense in Second Amendment issues, the different 
standards of scrutiny, and several judicial decisions regarding gun 
permit regulations and the scope of the Second Amendment. Second, 
this Note will address why elevated intermediate scrutiny is the 
appropriate standard the Seventh Circuit should have used when 
evaluating the Illinois substantial similarity requirement. Lastly, this 
Note will discuss how the Seventh Circuit would have found the 
substantial similarity requirement of the Illinois Firearm Concealed 
Carry Act unconstitutional if it assessed the requirement under 






                                                 
15 See Culp I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 1054; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
16 See Culp II, 921 F.3d 646, 655 (7th Cir. 2019); Culp I, 270 F. Supp. 3d at 
1054. 
17 See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 649. 
18 See id. 
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A. History and Role of Self-Defense in Second Amendment Issues 
 
Self-defense is often a driving factor courts consider in 
determining whether gun restriction laws infringe Second Amendment 
rights.19 The Second Amendment provides: “A well-regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”20 The Second 
Amendment provided people the right to bear arms, and the Supreme 
Court in District of Columbia v. Heller clarified for the first time 
whether the right to bear arms applied to individuals.21 The Court 
found the language regarding “a well-regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free State” did not limit the scope of the 
right to bear arms to the preservation of militias.22 As a result, the 
court in Heller found the Second Amendment granted an individual 
the right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.23 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court found prohibiting people from keeping handguns in 
the home was unconstitutional because the Court recognized the 
importance of people’s ability to defend themselves.24  
The Supreme Court in McDonald v. City of Chicago also 
recognized the correlation between the right to bear arms and the 
importance of self-defense.25 The Supreme Court in McDonald found 
the fundamental right of the Second Amendment is to bear arms for 
self-defense, and that right applies to the States under the Due Process 
                                                 
19See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008); Wrenn v. 
District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 2013). 
20 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
21 Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008). 
22 U.S. CONST. amend. II.; Johnathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and 
Our Nineteenth Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1492 
(2014).  
23 Meltzer, supra note 22, at 1492. 
24 Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. 
25 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 787 (2010). 
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Clause.26 Accordingly, the Court in McDonald found States cannot 
pass legislation which infringes the rights individuals have under the 
Second Amendment.27 However, many state and local governments 
attempt to pass their own laws which may not merely limit people’s 
right to bear arms, but bar people’s Second Amendment rights, and 
thus people’s ability to defend themselves.28 Therefore, courts often 
need to evaluate whether a state law which falls within the scope of 
the Second Amendment is a mere limitation, or if it infringes the rights 
people have under the Second Amendment and is unconstitutional.29 
 
B. Applying a Heightened Standard of Scrutiny in Second 
Amendment Cases 
 
Courts generally use a standard of scrutiny to determine the 
constitutionality of state laws.30 The Seventh Circuit, among other 
Circuits, has used a two-part approach to determine whether 
constitutional scrutiny should apply.31 First, following the two-
pronged approach inquiry, a law warrants a standard of scrutiny if “the 
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope 
of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”32 If the first prong is met, the 
second step of the inquiry is to apply an appropriate form of means-
end scrutiny.33 There are three traditional scrutiny standards which a 
court could apply: (1) a rational basis standard; (2) an intermediate 
scrutiny standard; and (3) a strict scrutiny standard.34 However, a court 
                                                 
26 Id. at 791 (finding there is a private right to self-defense). 
27 See id. 
28 See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 
650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
29 See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666. 
30 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
31 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United 
States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 
792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010). 
32 Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. 
33 Id. 
34 Heller, 554 U.S. at 634. 
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can also choose to not apply any specific standard of scrutiny if the 
court strongly believes the law “would fail constitutional muster.”35 
The Seventh Circuit found “the rigor of this judicial review will 
depend on how close the law comes to the core of the Second 
Amendment right and the severity of the law's burden on the right.”36 
Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of scrutiny.37 In order for a law 
to warrant strict scrutiny, the law must restrict a person’s right to bear 
arms at home.38 A peg below strict scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.39 
Courts analyze state laws under a standard of intermediate scrutiny if 
the law imposes a burden on the Second Amendment outside the 
home.40 Lastly, a court could choose to apply the lowest standard of 
scrutiny, the rational basis standard.41 However, the Supreme Court’s 
reference to constitutional scrutiny standards in Heller meant any 
“heightened standard of scrutiny; the Court specifically excluded 
rational-basis review.”42 For this reason, courts should never analyze a 
state law which imposes a burden on the Second Amendment under a 
rational basis standard of review.43 
 
C. Judicial Decisions on Gun Permit Regulations and the Scope 
of the Second Amendment 
 
The Supreme Court set the foundation of precedent regarding gun 
regulations and the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. 
                                                 
35 See id. at 628-629. 
36 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703. 
37 Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 547 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 
2008). 
38 Kachalsky v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (interprets 
core of Second Amendment to be self-defense in the home but Heller never 
says that, rather Heller finds self-defense in general is the core of the Second 
Amendment and the home is where need for self-defense is most acute). 
39 Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
40 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky, 701 
F.3d at 93. 
41 Wagner v. Haslam, 112 F. Supp. 3d 673, 692 (M.D. Tenn. 2015). 
42 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701 (7th Cir. 2011). 
43 Id. 
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Heller.44 In Heller, the Supreme Court found the District of 
Columbia's prohibition on possessing handguns in the home 
unconstitutional.45 The Supreme Court in Heller reasoned the District 
of Columbia’s law substantially infringed the core component of the 
Second Amendment, an individual’s right to self-defense.46 
Furthermore, the District’s prohibition significantly affected the right 
to self-defense in the home.47 The Supreme Court found the home is 
“where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most 
acute,” and to prohibit the protection of one’s home with a handgun, 
“the quintessential self-defense weapon,” was unconstitutional.48 The 
Supreme Court in Heller did not apply a specific standard of scrutiny, 
but found regardless of the standard applied, the prohibition would fail 
the test.49 
The Court expanded this holding in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago.50 The Court found the Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms also applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.51 Consequently, McDonald opened the 
floodgates for States to regulate gun possession because the Supreme 
Court in Heller never found the need for self-defense was nonexistent 
outside the home.52 By McDonald incorporating the Second 
Amendment to the States when Heller inferred self-defense existed 
outside the home, States were free to regulate and attempt to ban 
people’s use of guns in public. 
In Moore v. Madigan, the Seventh Circuit found an Illinois law 
which prohibited the carrying of a gun in public, loaded or unloaded, 
                                                 
44 David B. Kopel and Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second 
Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 200 (2017). 
45 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
46 Id. at 630. 
47 Id. at 628. 
48 Id. at 628-629. 
49 Id. 
50 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). 
51Id. at 791. 
52 See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (where the court 
found the need for self-defense exists outside the home as well). 
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violated the Second Amendment.53 Although the Court in Heller and 
McDonald recognized the need for self-defense was most acute in the 
home, the Seventh Circuit recognized that Heller and McDonald never 
concluded self-defense is not acute outside the home.54 The court 
found reasonable limitations, consistent with the Second Amendment, 
can be placed to regulate guns outside the home.55 However, blanket 
bans which infringe the core of the Second Amendment, the right to 
self-defense, are not reasonable and do not warrant a standard of 
scrutiny.56 Thus, the court in Moore followed the framework of Heller 
and chose not to apply a standard of scrutiny because the regulation 
was an unjustified blanket ban on the core of the Second Amendment, 
and was unconstitutional.57 Therefore, according to the Seventh 
Circuit, the core of the Second Amendment is personal self-defense, 
not only self-defense in the home, expanding the framework of Heller 
outside the home.58 
Following Heller, courts are split on whether a level of scrutiny 
should be applied in assessing restrictions to the Second Amendment, 
or if no standard of scrutiny is appropriate because the law is bound to 
be unconstitutional.59 For example, some States established good 
reason laws, which allow individuals to carry a firearm only if they 
provide a good reason.60 But courts are in disagreement whether the 
good reason restrictions warrant a standard of scrutiny or if they are 
bound to fail constitutional muster.61  
In Woollard v. Gallagher, a Fourth Circuit court addressed 
whether Maryland’s requirement for a person to have a good and 
substantial reason to “carry, wear, or transport a handgun in public” 
                                                 
53 Id. at 942. 
54 Id. at 935. 
55 Id. at 942. 
56 Id. at 940 (finding a great justification would be needed but there is no 
possible justification for such a broad ban). 
57 Id. at 941. 
58 See id. 
59 See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2017); 
Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013). 
60 See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. 
61 See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. 
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was constitutional under the Second Amendment.62 The court in 
Woollard found Maryland’s law imposed a substantial burden on 
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment, and consequently 
applied a standard of intermediate scrutiny to determine whether the 
law was constitutional.63 In addition, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court in Wrenn v. District of Columbia also addressed a good reason 
law.64 However, the court in Wrenn found the District’s good reason 
law for carrying a gun outside the home did not warrant a standard of 
scrutiny and ruled the law was unconstitutional.65 Therefore, courts are 
split on whether an intermediate standard of scrutiny should apply to 
Second Amendment restrictions, whether strict scrutiny should apply, 
or whether a court should treat Second Amendment restrictions like 
the handgun ban in Heller and not apply any standard of scrutiny 
because the law is bound to fail.66 
II. WHY ELEVATED INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IS THE APPROPRIATE 
STANDARD THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE USED WHEN 
EVALUATING THE ILLINOIS SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY 
REQUIREMENT 
This Part evaluates why the standard of elevated intermediate 
scrutiny is the appropriate standard for the Supreme Court to use when 
evaluating the concealed carry license regulation. In applying the two-
pronged approach, a law warrants a heightened standard of scrutiny if 
“the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the 
scope of the Second Amendment.”67 The next step is to apply an 
“appropriate form of means-end scrutiny.”68 While courts often 
present the inquiry as a two-part inquiry, the first part of the inquiry 
can be split into two sub-parts: (1) whether the law in question falls 
                                                 
62 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 871. 
63 Id. at 876. 
64 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655. 
65 Id. at 666. 
66 See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. 
67 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875. 
68 Id. 
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within the scope of the conduct under the Second Amendment; and (2) 
whether the law in question imposes a burden on such conduct.69 As 
found by the courts in Woollard and Wrenn, good reason laws fall 
within the scope of conduct addressed in the Second Amendment.70 
Furthermore, while the court in Wrenn did not find the good reason 
law was constitutional, the court nevertheless found the law fell within 
the scope of conduct addressed in the Second Amendment.71  
Similar to good reasons laws, Illinois's substantial similarity 
requirement falls within the scope of the Second Amendment. The 
Second Amendment sets out the right of the people to bear arms both 
inside and outside of the home.72 Like good reason laws, Illinois’s 
substantial similarity requirement falls within the scope of the Second 
Amendment because the substantial similarity requirement relates to 
people’s ability to carry guns outside the home.73 To complete the first 
step of the two-pronged approach, a court must determine whether the 
substantial similarity requirement burdens the people’s rights to bear 
arms under the Second Amendment.74 
A.  Illinois’s Substantial Similarity Requirement Imposes a 
Substantial Burden on Second Amendment Rights 
Illinois’s substantial similarity requirement places a substantial 
burden on the rights falling under the Second Amendment. A law 
burdens the rights of the Second Amendment if it negatively impacts a 
person’s ability to use a firearm for self-defense.75 However, rather 
than creating a roadblock, if a law completely prohibits a person from 
exercising their right to have a firearm for self-defense, it is 
“appropriate to strike down such ‘total ban[s]’ without bothering to 
                                                 
69 See id. 
70 See Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 655; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 868. 
71 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 661. 
72 Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 936 (7th Cir. 2012). 
73 Id. 
74 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875. 
75 See id. at 876. 
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apply tiers of scrutiny because no such analysis could ever sanction 
obliterations of an enumerated constitutional right.”76  
In Wrenn, the court found the good reason law did not simply 
impose a burden on the rights which fall under the Second 
Amendment, but rather the good reason law essentially completely 
barred people from their Second Amendment right.77 The good reason 
law was not a flat-out total ban because some people, but not all, were 
allowed to carry a gun under the regulation. For example, if a person 
provided a good reason, they could carry a gun.78 However, the court 
in Wrenn found the exception did not preclude the good reason law 
from being viewed as a total ban because the law made it impossible 
for guns to be available to each responsible citizen.79 Thus, the court 
found good reason laws were “necessarily a total ban” because the law 
ultimately had the same effect as the handgun ban in Heller.80 
Similar to the good reason laws in Wrenn, the Illinois substantial 
similarity requirement shares characteristics of being essentially a total 
ban. The Illinois substantial similarity requirement virtually makes it 
impossible for most nonresidents to carry a gun.81 As provided by the 
substantial similarity requirement, a nonresident who does not live in a 
state with substantially similar concealed carry requirements is not 
able to apply for an Illinois concealed carry license.82 “To determine 
which states have substantially similar regulatory schemes, Illinois 
undertakes a survey process. The State Police send a survey to all 
other states seeking information regarding their regulation of firearm 
possession and related criminal history and mental health reporting.”83 
Only four states qualify as having “substantially similar” concealed 
carry licensing standards: Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and 
Virginia.84  
                                                 
76 Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 665. 
77 Id. at 666. 
78 Id. at 665. 
79 Id. at 665-666. 
80 Id. 
81 Culp II, 921 F.3d 646, 651 (7th Cir. 2019). 
82 Id. at 648-649. 
83 Id. at 651. 
84 Id. 
11
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Importantly, the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act does not 
provide a stricter application for nonresidents to obtain a concealed 
carry license in Illinois.85 Rather, the substantial similarity provision 
outright denies nonresidents who do not reside in Arkansas, 
Mississippi, Texas, or Virginia from applying for an Illinois concealed 
carry license, regardless of whether they lack a criminal history or do 
not suffer from mental illness.86 Thus, it is impossible for ordinarily 
situated residents of forty-five states to assert their Second 
Amendment right in Illinois via a concealed carry license.87  
However, while the substantial similarity provision makes it 
impossible for nonresidents of forty-five states to obtain a concealed 
carry license in Illinois, “[i]ndividuals living outside a substantially 
similar state are not without firearm privileges in Illinois.”88 
According to the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act, nonresidents 
who hold a concealed carry permit in the state which they reside are 
legally able to possess a gun in their vehicle while driving in Illinois.89  
The Illinois Firearm Owners Identification Card Act also grants 
certain gun privileges to nonresidents who are authorized to possess a 
firearm in their home state.90 According the Illinois Firearm Owners 
Identification Card Act, nonresidents who are authorized to possess a 
firearm in their home state may legally possess a gun in Illinois “while 
on their own premises or in the home of an Illinois resident with 
permission, . . . while hunting, . . . and while engaging in target 
practice at a firing or shooting range.”91 Furthermore, if a firearm is 
enclosed in a case and unloaded, it is legal for nonresidents to possess 
it in Illinois.92 However, nonresidents’ gun privileges regarding the 
                                                 
85 See 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/40 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-
591)  
86 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 651. 
87 See id. 
88 Id. at 652. 
89 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/40(e) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-591). 
90 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/40(b)(10) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-
591). 
91 Id. 
92 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/2(b)(9) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-
591); Culp II, 921 F.3d at 652. 
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ability to carry a gun for hunting, for target practice, and to enclose an 
unloaded firearm in a case are not directly related to situations where a 
person would use a firearm for self-defense. But ultimately, because 
guns are legally available for all nonresidents to a degree, the 
substantial similarity law is not a total ban.93  
Because the substantial similarity requirement does not act as a 
total ban, the court in Culp was correct to analyze the requirement 
with constitutional scrutiny like the court in Woollard.94 In Woollard, 
the petitioner challenged Maryland’s good reason law to carry guns 
outside the home.95 The court found the good reason law did not 
completely bar individuals from their rights under the Second 
Amendment, but found the law burdened those rights.96 As a result, 
the court in Woollard chose to apply constitutional scrutiny rather than 
find the law outright unconstitutional because it was bound to fail any 
test.97  
Similar to the good reason law, the substantial similarity 
requirement still acts as a burden on people’s Second Amendment 
rights even if it does not totally bar them from exercising their rights. 
Like the good reason law in Woollard, the Illinois substantial 
similarity requirement applies only to the concealed carrying of a gun 
in public.98 The substantial similarity requirement prohibits 
nonresidents who do not reside in a substantially similar state from 
using firearms for self-defense outside their home unless they have a 
concealed carry license in their resident state and are traveling in a 
vehicle, or are on their own premises or in the home of an Illinois 
resident who granted permission.99 Yet, there is no way for 
nonresidents who live outside of a substantially similar state to walk in 
public with a concealed firearm for the purpose of self-defense as 
                                                 
93 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 652; see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 
650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
94 Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013). 
95 Id. at 868-870. 
96 See id. at 875. 
97 Id. at 876. 
98 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 652. 
99 Id. at 648-649, 652.  
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granted by the Second Amendment.100 Ultimately, because the 
substantial similarity requirement does not act as a total ban but 
greatly hinders people’s ability to assert their Second Amendment 
right, the substantial similarity requirement is a significant burden on 
people’s Second Amendment right.101  
B. Intermediate Scrutiny as the Applicable Tier of Scrutiny 
Because the substantial similarity requirement places a burden on 
the rights afforded by the Second Amendment, the next step in the 
inquiry is to determine which tier of scrutiny to apply.102 The more a 
law burdens the core of the Second Amendment, the higher the tier of 
scrutiny a court applies when analyzing its constitutionality.103 
According to the Supreme Court in Heller, the core of the Second 
Amendment is self-defense104 and the home is “where the need for 
defense of self, family, and property is most acute.”105 Consequently, 
any law which burdens the core of the Second Amendment where it is 
most acute warrants strict scrutiny.106 In other words, a law hindering 
a person’s ability to bear arms for self-defense at home warrants strict 
scrutiny.107  
For example, in Gowder v. City of Chicago, the district court found 
strict scrutiny was appropriate to analyze a Chicago ordinance which 
barred non-violent misdemeanants from receiving a permit to possess 
a firearm at home.108 The court found strict scrutiny was appropriate 
                                                 
100 See id. at 652. 
101 See id. at 648-649, 652. 
102 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 875. 
103 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
104 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008). 
105 Id. at 628. 
106 See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; Gowder v. City of Chicago, 923 F. Supp. 2d 
1110, 1123 (N.D. Ill. 2012). 
107 See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; Gowder, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
108 Gowder, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1117, 1123. (the court chose to apply strict 
scrutiny but because the law was a total ban, the court could have chosen not to 
analyze the law under constitutional scrutiny and find it per se 
unconstitutional). 
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because the ordinance “directly restrict[ed] the core Second 
Amendment right of armed self-defense in one's home.”109 Therefore, 
a law warrants a strict scrutiny analysis if it restricts a person’s ability 
to bear arms for self-defense at home.110 
Intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard to apply to a 
burden to Second Amendment rights outside of the home.111 First, 
courts have not rejected intermediate scrutiny like they have rejected 
strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard for restrictions to the Second 
Amendment.112 For example, the court in Kachalsky v. City of 
Westchester found “applying less than strict scrutiny when the 
regulation does not burden the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the 
home makes eminent sense.”113 In addition, the court in Woollard 
found rather than strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny was the 
appropriate standard to apply to laws which burden the rights of the 
Second Amendment outside the home.114  
While the court in Kachalsky found it should apply less than strict 
scrutiny for laws burdening Second Amendment rights outside the 
home, the rational basis standard is not appropriate for analyzing the 
substantial similarity requirement.115 “Almost all circuit cases agree 
                                                 
109 Id. at 1124. (the core of the Second Amendment is self-defense, not self-
defense in the home, but the home is where self-defense is most acute). 
110 See Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; Gowder, 923 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. 
111See Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013). 
112See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876.; Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th 
Cir. 2012). 
113 Kachalsky v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012).  
114 Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876. 
115 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n. 27 (2008) (rational 
basis review “could not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature 
may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it . . . the right to keep and bear 
arms . . . If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms 
was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the 
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no 
effect.”); Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 701 (“For our purposes, 
however, we know that Heller’s reference to ‘any standard of scrutiny’ means 
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that any law which burdens Second Amendment rights must receive 
something stricter than rational basis review.”116 The Second Circuit 
incorrectly found laws which burden the Second Amendment but not 
to a substantial degree warrant a rational basis standard.117 However, 
the Supreme Court in Heller “very explicitly rejected mere rational 
basis review for all regulations that burden the Second Amendment, to 
any degree.”118 Accordingly, intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate 
tier of scrutiny to apply for a burden to Second Amendment rights 
outside of the home.119 
Courts can apply intermediate scrutiny traditionally or more 
rigorously.120 In Ezell v. City of Chicago, the plaintiffs claimed a 
Chicago ordinance which required firing-range training as prerequisite 
to lawful gun ownership, but prohibited all firing ranges in city, 
violated their Second Amendment rights.121 Because the Chicago 
ordinance curtailed the rights of law-abiding citizens and came very 
close to “implicating the core of the Second Amendment,” the court 
applied a more rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny.122 The test the 
court applied was harder to pass than intermediate scrutiny, but not as 
rigorous as strict scrutiny.123  
While traditional intermediate scrutiny requires the government to 
show: (1) its action sought to advance a substantial government 
interest; and (2) there is a reasonable fit between the contested law and 
the governmental objectives,124 the court in Ezell required the 
government to show: (1) “an extremely strong public-interest 
justification;” and (2) “a close fit” between the government’s means 
                                                 
any heightened standard of scrutiny; the Court specifically excluded rational-
basis review.”) 
116 Kopel and Greenlee, supra note 44, at 274. 
117 Id. at 288. 
118 Id. at 289. 
119 See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93. 
120 See, e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
121 Id. at 689-690. 
122 Id. at 708. 
123 Id.  
124 Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013). 
16
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
 
and its end.”125 Thus, the test in Ezell is more rigorous because it 
requires a showing of “extremely strong” public-interest rather than 
“substantial” government interest and requires a “close fit” between 
the law and the government’s goal rather than a “reasonable fit.”126 
However, it does not reach the level of strict scrutiny because under 
strict scrutiny, the government must show: (1) the law is “necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest;” and (2) the law was “narrowly 
tailored to achieve that interest.”127 In People v. Bell, the court referred 
to the test applied in Ezell as “elevated intermediate scrutiny.”128  
The court in Culp v. Raoul should have applied elevated 
intermediate scrutiny rather than traditional intermediate scrutiny. Like 
the plaintiffs in Ezell, the plaintiffs in Culp were not criminals or 
misdemeanants.129 Rather, the plaintiffs in Culp were also “‘law-
abiding, responsible citizens’ whose Second Amendment rights are 
entitled to full solicitude.”130 Furthermore, the substantial similarity 
requirement assessed in Culp is a severe burden on nonresidents and is 
closely proximate to the core of the Second Amendment. The 
substantial similarity requirement is a severe burden because it 
effectively bans nonresidents of forty-five states from applying for a 
concealed carry license, and thus greatly restricts their ability to use 
firearms for self-defense in Illinois.131 In addition, the effect of the 
substantial similarity requirement has the potential to impact 
significantly more people than the ordinance in Ezell.132 Therefore, the 
substantial similarity requirement should have been analyzed under the 
same standard in Ezell, the standard of elevated intermediate 
scrutiny.133  
                                                 
125 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
126 Drake, 724 F.3d at 436; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708; 
127 Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs' Ass'n v. Clarke, 588 F.3d 523, 530 (7th Cir. 
2009). 
128 People v. Bell, 2018 IL App (1st) 153373, ¶ 26. 
129 Culp II, 921 F.3d 646, 652 (7th Cir. 2019); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
130 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 652. 
131 Id. at 653-654. 
132 Culp I, 840 F.3d 400, 407 (7th Cir. 2016) (Manion, D. dissenting).  
133 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
17
Share: Exposing the Unconstitutionality of the Illinois Firearm Conceale
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2019
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
 
In sum, the substantial similarity requirement is within the scope 
of the Second Amendment and substantially burdens people’s Second 
Amendment rights.134 While the requirement is a substantial burden, it 
is not a total ban because the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act and 
the Illinois Firearm Owners Identification Card Act grant certain gun 
privileges to nonresidents.135 Because the law is not a total ban, it 
warrants constitutional scrutiny.136 Intermediate scrutiny is the 
appropriate tier of scrutiny because the law does not restrict a 
nonresident’s ability to bear arms in their home.137  
Although intermediate scrutiny is appropriate over rational basis or 
strict scrutiny, the Seventh Circuit in Culp failed to use a more 
rigorous form of intermediate scrutiny known as “elevated 
intermediate scrutiny.”138 The court should have applied elevated 
intermediate scrutiny because the plaintiffs in Culp were law-abiding, 
responsible citizens, the substantially similarity requirement is a 
severe burden to people’s Second Amendment rights, and the 
requirement comes close to the core of the Second Amendment, the 
right to bear arms for self-defense.139 Hence, elevated intermediate 
scrutiny is the appropriate standard the Seventh Circuit should have 
used when evaluating the Illinois substantial similarity requirement.  
III. THE SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY PERMITTING REGULATION IS 
NOT CONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT FAILS UNDER ELEVATED 
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
                                                 
134 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 653-654 (the requirement prohibits nonresidents of 
forty-five states from applying for a concealed carry gun license). 
135 Id. at 652; see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 665-666 
(D.C. Cir. 2017). 
136 See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 648-649, 652; Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 
876 (4th Cir. 2013). 
137 See Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Kachalsky v. City of Westchester, 701 F.3d 
81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012);  
138 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655. 
139 See id. at 652-654; Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
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This Part analyzes the application of the elevated intermediate 
scrutiny standard to the Illinois substantial similarity requirement 
under the Second Amendment, and as a result, establishes the Seventh 
Circuit should have found the substantial similarity requirement 
unconstitutional. In Culp, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the contested 
requirement under a normal standard of intermediate scrutiny. Under a 
normal standard of intermediate scrutiny, the government must show: 
(1) its action sought to advance a substantial government interest; and 
(2) there is a reasonable fit between the substantial similarity 
requirement and the governmental objectives.140 However, the Seventh 
Circuit should have analyzed the substantial similarity requirement 
with elevated intermediate scrutiny. In order to satisfy elevated 
intermediate scrutiny, the government must show: (1) “an extremely 
strong public-interest justification;” and (2) “a close fit between the 
government's means and its end.”141  
A. Illinois’s Extremely Strong Public Safety Interest 
In Culp v. Raoul, the court assessed the substantial similarity 
requirement with the traditional form of intermediate scrutiny.142 
According the principles of traditional intermediate scrutiny, Illinois 
had the burden of showing it prohibited nonresidents outside of 
substantially similar states from applying for an Illinois concealed 
carry license to advance a substantial government interest.143 Illinois 
made clear its ultimate interest was keeping the public safe.144 Rather 
than Illinois having the burden of showing its action was to advance a 
substantial government interest, elevated intermediate scrutiny 
requires Illinois to show it had an “extremely strong public-interest 
justification” in passing the substantial similarity requirement.145 The 
Seventh Circuit would only have to look at the strength of Illinois’s 
                                                 
140 See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013). 
141 Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
142 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655. 
143 See Drake, 724 F.3d at 436. 
144 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 648. 
145 Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708. 
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public-interest reasoning in applying elevated intermediate scrutiny 
because public-interest was Illinois’s justification under traditional 
intermediate scrutiny and the substantial similarity requirement passed 
such review.146 
Illinois’s primary concern is keeping people with a history of 
criminality or mental illness from receiving concealed carry 
licenses.147 While the core component of the Second Amendment is 
the right to keep and bear arms for individual self-defense, the 
Supreme Court in Heller found there are longstanding regulations 
which limit the scope of the Second Amendment, such as bans on gun 
possession by felons and mentally ill people.148 Courts have followed 
the longstanding right recognized in Heller to categorically ban 
firearm possession by felons and mentally ill people.149 In United 
States v. Shields, the Seventh Circuit found “keeping firearms out of 
the hands of violent felons is an important objective.”150 In Tyler v. 
Hillsdale County Sherriff’s Department, the Sixth Circuit found the 
government had a compelling interest for wanting to keep 
presumptively risky people, such as people with mental illness, from 
possessing firearms.151  
Further, while traditional intermediate scrutiny does not require a 
“compelling” government interest, many courts have found the 
government’s interest in public safety is a “compelling reason.”152 
Therefore, because courts often find a government’s interest in public 
safety compelling under traditional intermediate scrutiny, the court in 
Culp would have likely found the government had a strong public-
safety interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of felons and 
mentally ill people under elevated intermediate scrutiny. Thus, the 
substantial similarity requirement would likely have satisfied the first 
                                                 
146 See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655; Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
147 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 648. 
148 District of Columbia. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
149 See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 837 F.3d 678, 693 (6th Cir. 
2016); United States v. Shields, 789 F.3d 733, 750 (7th Cir. 2015).  
150 Shields, 789 F.3d at 750. 
151 Tyler, 837 F.3d at 693. 
152 United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 473 (4th Cir. 2011). 
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prong of analysis under elevated intermediate scrutiny.153 However, 
the government must also show that the substantial similarity 
requirement was a close fit for ensuring mentally ill people and felons 
were not able to attain concealed carry licenses.154  
B. The Substantial Similarity Requirement is Not a Close Fit 
While the Seventh Circuit would likely have found Illinois’s 
public-safety interest in ensuring people with a record of criminality or 
mental illness did not possess firearms was extremely strong, the 
government would likely fail to show the substantial similarity 
requirement was a close fit to meet the government’s goal. First, the 
court would have to analyze the rationale behind the constructed law 
before determining how closely the law fits the desired goal. 
 
1. Illinois’s Rationale Behind the Substantial Similarity 
Requirement 
 
The Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act provides for an 
applicant to obtain a concealed carry license, the applicant must show, 
among other things,  
 
that he is not a clear and present danger to himself or a threat 
to public safety and, within the past five years, has not been a 
patient in a mental hospital, convicted of a violent 
misdemeanor or two or more violations of driving under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol, or participated in a residential or 
court-ordered drug or alcohol treatment program.155 
 
The Act also requires the State Police conduct a thorough 
background check of each applicant.156 Further, because a concealed 
                                                 
153 See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir. 2011). 
154 See Culp II, 921 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2019); Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (7th 
Cir. 2011). 
155 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 650. 
156 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/35 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-591). 
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carry license lasts for five years, the Act requires ongoing monitoring 
so the State can revoke any licensee of their license if any 
disqualifying circumstances arise.157 For example, if a concealed carry 
license holder involuntarily becomes an inpatient at a mental health 
facility, the person’s concealed carry license would be revoked.158  
However, implementing the initial and ongoing background 
checks on nonresidents is a challenge for the Illinois government.159 
“Illinois does not have access to other states’ criminal history 
databases or mental health repositories. Nor are other States required 
to provide this information to Illinois or, more generally, to include the 
information in a national database to which the Illinois State Police 
have access.”160 Because Illinois could not access records of 
nonresidents, Illinois found if nonresidents were qualified to have a 
concealed carry license in their home state, and the requirements of 
their home state were substantially similar to those of Illinois, then 
they could apply for an Illinois concealed carry license.161  
 
The law of another state is deemed ‘substantially similar’ if the 
[S]tate, like Illinois, (1) regulates who may carry firearms in 
public; (2) prohibits those with involuntary mental health 
admissions, and those with voluntary admissions within the 
past five years, from carrying firearms in public; (3) reports 
denied persons to the FBI’s National Instant Criminal 
Background System; and (4) participates in reporting persons 
authorized to carry firearms in public through the National 
Law Enforcement Telecommunications System.162  
 
                                                 
157 See 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 66/70 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-
591); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 65/8/1(West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-
591). 
158 See Culp II, 921 F.3d at 650. 
159 See id. at 651. 
160 Id. 
161 Id.  
162 Id. 
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 5
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol15/iss1/5
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                       Volume 15                                          Fall 2019 
 
 
Through this system, Illinois knows that if a person in a 
substantially similar state has a concealed carry license, then they were 
not a criminal or mentally ill at the time they received their license.163 
Furthermore, because the substantially similar state must also report 
persons authorized to carry through a national system, Illinois will 
know if at any point during a person’s five-year licensing period that 
the person’s license is revoked in their home state.164 Thus, Illinois 
uses states with substantially similar concealed carry requirements as a 
proxy to solve its information deficit issue.165  
 
2. Why the Substantial Similarity Requirement is Not a Close Fit 
to Illinois’s Goal 
 
Although Illinois’s substantial similarity requirement solves the 
government’s information deficit issue and helps ensure criminals and 
mentally ill people cannot receive a concealed carry permit in Illinois, 
the requirement is not closely fit to achieve the government’s goal. 
Only four states meet Illinois’s criteria for having substantially similar 
gun licensing requirements.166 As a result, nonresidents of forty-five 
states are unable to apply for an Illinois concealed carry license.167 The 
substantial similarity requirement thus negatively impacts the majority 
of America.168  
Most importantly, Illinois’s substantial similarity requirement is 
both extremely overinclusive and underinclusive.169 For example, an 
Illinois resident who has a holding permit can travel to Missouri to be 
a patient in a mental-health clinic, then return to Illinois without the 
government ever knowing.170 Also, a person could live in one or 
several of the dissimilar states for multiple years, then move to one of 
                                                 




167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 Id. at 660 (Manion, D., dissenting). 
170 Id.  
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the four substantially similar states, thus “automatically becoming 
eligible to apply for a license even though ‘Illinois (and, presumably, 
the substantially similar state as well) [would be] unable to obtain 
information about his possible criminal or mental problems in those 
states.’”171  And yet, the most qualified, reasonable person may not 
obtain an Illinois carrying license if they are a nonresident from a 
dissimilar state.172 For example, “a colonel in the United States Air 
Force licensed as a concealed-carry instructor in Illinois cannot apply 
for a concealed-carry license of his own because he is a resident of 
Pennsylvania.”173  
While the government is aware of the overinclusive and 
underinclusive nature of the substantial similarity requirement, it is 
willing to accept the negative impact of the requirement to solve its 
administrative difficulties.174 Without the substantial similarity 
requirement, Illinois would be forced to obtain nonresident applicants’ 
information in a much more burdensome way.175 However, “the 
Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.”176 
Therefore, depriving someone of a constitutional right cannot be 
justified by simply avoiding cost and easing the administrative burden 
on the government.177 
Further, there are other methods to attaining an applicant’s 
background information. “The State could modify its present practices 
by, for example, requiring a sworn declaration on a nonresident’s 
mental health from a treating physician or shifting more of the cost of 
obtaining out-of-state criminal history information to the nonresident 
applicant.”178 The Seventh Circuit in Culp recognized sufficient 
alternatives to obtaining applicant’s information, but the Court found 
issue with the government’s ability to continue monitoring license 
                                                 
171 Id. (quoting Culp I, 840 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2016)). 
172 See id. 648-49 (majority opinion). 
173 Id. at 660 (Manion, D., dissenting). 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 660-61. 
176 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
177 See id. 
178 Culp II, 921 F.3d at 655. 
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holders.179 Thus, the Court found the substantial similarity requirement 
was reasonable and Illinois could rely on the national database to 
monitor residents of substantially similar states.180  
Illinois’s ultimate goal is to ensure mentally ill people and 
criminals could not obtain a concealed carry license in Illinois, but the 
system Illinois has in place regarding its substantial similarity 
requirement is severely flawed for closely fitting that goal.181 First, 
Illinois determines which states are substantially similar by sending 
out a survey.182 The last survey Illinois sent out was in 2015.183 The 
2015 survey recognized Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia 
had substantially similar concealed carry licenses in place.184 Yet, the 
survey prior to the 2015 survey was sent out in 2013, and recognized 
that in addition to Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia, the 
concealed carry requirements in Hawaii, New Mexico and South 
Carolina were substantially similar as well.185  
Because Illinois did not find Hawaii’s, New Mexico’s and South 
Carolina’s concealed carry requirements were substantially similar 
from the 2015 survey, it suggests the laws in those states changed to 
the point Illinois did not find them substantially similar.186 Not only 
does it suggest a state’s concealed carry license requirements can 
change, “it evidences that laws and practices can materially change in 
a short amount of time.”187 However, Illinois has not sent out a survey 
in four years.188 Thus, Illinois’s failure to send out a survey since 2015 
and ensure the states it deemed substantially similar still meet that 
                                                 
179 Id. 
180 See id. 
181 Id. at 660 (Manion, D., dissenting). 
182 Id. at 651 (majority opinion) 
183 Id.  
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 659 (Manion, D., dissenting). 
186 Id. at 662. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 651 (majority opinion) (the last survey sent was in 2015 and this 
article was written in 2019). 
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criteria “significantly undermines its argument that its system is 
tailored to its goal.”189 
Furthermore, Illinois’s reliance on other states barely provides the 
up-to-date monitoring the government claims it needs.190 Illinois 
considers Virginia and Arkansas to have substantially similar licensing 
standards, and yet, Virginia and Arkansas rely on residents to report 
any of their own mental health issues.191 If a resident of Virginia or 
Arkansas does not self-report a mental health issue, then the state 
government would not know that the resident should be disqualified 
from having a concealed carry license.192 Consequently, the Illinois 
government would not know either.193 Regardless, Illinois relies on the 
systems in place in Virginia and Arkansas.194  
In addition, it is dangerous for Illinois to rely on national 
databases for monitoring license holders and background checks.195 
For example, Illinois considers Mississippi a substantially similar 
state, yet it can take over a year for the national database to be updated 
with the record of a person’s felony conviction in Mississippi.196 The 
same problems arise regarding mental-health records.197 Arkansas, 
another state which Illinois considers substantially similar, reports its 
mental health records “at a per-capita rate that is aberrantly low 
compared to other states.”198 Hence, the deficiencies of the national 
database system regarding background checks and ongoing monitoring 
further prove Illinois’s substantial similarity requirement is not a close 
fit to serve its goal.199  
                                                 
189 Id. at 662 (Manion, D., dissenting). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. at 651 (majority opinion). 
194 Id. at 662 (Manion, D., dissenting). 
195 See id. 
196 Id. 
197 See id. 
198 Id. (quoting Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in Support of 
Appellees and Affirmance at 19-20, n. 29, Culp II, 921 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 
2019) (No. 17-2998)). 
199 Id. 
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Lastly, Illinois does not need to implement the substantial 
similarity requirement for the government to continuously monitor 
nonresidents who have concealed carry licenses.200 Illinois could 
require nonresidents to “submit verified, quarterly updates on their 
statuses, including quarterly mental-health certifications,” rather than 
rely on the national database and its known deficiencies.201 This 
system would provide “timely and accurate information the national 
databases cannot guarantee.”202 Further, Illinois could utilize this 
measure only for states which were not substantially similar if the 
government changes its frequency of surveying substantially similar 
state residents.203 As a result, all law abiding, responsible citizens of 
the United States would be able to apply for a nonresident concealed 
carry license.204 But currently, given the several problems associated 
with Illinois’s system and the substantial similarity requirement, the 
Seventh Circuit would not find there is a close fit between Illinois’s 
substantial similarity requirement and the government’s goal to keep 




The Seventh Circuit’s erroneous decision in Culp v. Raoul invites 
a detailed exploration into the analysis for burdens to the Second 
Amendment. In analyzing laws which burden the Second Amendment, 
a court will apply a higher tier of constitutional scrutiny based on the 
severity of the burden and the proximity of the law to the core of the 
Second Amendment. However, if a law acts as a total ban on people’s 
Second Amendment rights rather than a burden, a court may choose 
not to apply any standard of scrutiny because the law is bound to be 
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court in Heller v. District of Columbia 
did just that. The Court evaluated the constitutionality of a city 
prohibition on possessing handguns in the home and found the 
                                                 
200 See id.  
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 See id. 
204 Id. 
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prohibition unconstitutional without analyzing the law under any 
standard of constitutional scrutiny. Although it did not apply any 
scrutiny, the Supreme Court in Heller explicitly rejected mere rational 
basis review for any regulations that burden the Second Amendment, 
to any degree.  
Heller was also very important because it recognized the core of 
the Second Amendment is a person’s right to bear arms for self-
defense. The prohibition in Heller impacted the ability to bear arms in 
the home, and the Supreme Court noted the home is where the need 
for self-defense is most acute. However, the Seventh Circuit in Moore 
v. Madigan, found that although the Court recognized the need for 
self-defense was most acute in the home, the Court never concluded 
self-defense is not acute outside the home. The Seventh Circuit in 
Moore evaluated a prohibition on the carrying of guns in public and 
found the prohibition unconstitutional without basing its decision on a 
degree of constitutional scrutiny. Thus, the Seventh Circuit did not 
interpret Heller to find that the core of the Second Amendment must 
be limited to the context of that case, the home. Rather the Seventh 
Circuit should broadly interpret the core of the Second Amendment to 
be self-defense in nearly any location. 
In Culp v. Raoul, the Seventh Circuit applied intermediate 
scrutiny to evaluate the burden of the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry 
Act on nonresidents and found the requirement was constitutional. The 
court needed to apply constitutional scrutiny because the substantial 
similarity requirement had an exception which made guns lawfully 
available to all nonresidents who were licensed in their home state, 
such as the right to travel with a firearm in a car or at their own home 
in Illinois. Thus, the right to possess guns in Illinois is available to all 
nonresidents, but it is impossible for a nonresident of a state that does 
not have substantially similar requirements to get an Illinois concealed 
carry license.  
Further, the court was correct not to apply strict scrutiny. Second 
Amendment restrictions typically only warrant strict scrutiny if the 
law burdens the right to possess a firearm in the home. And based on 
the exceptions to the Illinois Firearm Concealed Carry Act, the Act 
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does not strip a nonresident’s right to possess a firearm in their home 
in Illinois.  
The court found the requirement constitutional under traditional 
intermediate scrutiny. The court found the requirement sought to 
advance ensuring criminals and mentally ill people did not obtain 
guns, and the requirement was reasonably fit to achieve that interest. 
But while intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate tier of scrutiny to 
analyze the substantial similarity requirement, the Seventh Circuit has 
recognized intermediate scrutiny as a sliding scale. The Seventh 
Circuit has recognized there is a more rigorous form of intermediate 
scrutiny than traditional intermediate scrutiny. The more rigorous form 
of intermediate scrutiny is known as elevated intermediate scrutiny.  
Under elevated intermediate scrutiny, the government must show: 
(1) an extremely strong public-interest justification, and (2), a close fit 
between the government's means and its end. The Seventh Circuit in 
Culp failed to apply elevated intermediate scrutiny in its analysis of 
the substantial similarity requirement. The requirement warranted such 
an analysis because the law placed a severe burden on nonresidents of 
forty-five states to fully assert their right to bear arms. Furthermore, 
the law came into close proximity with the core of the Second 
Amendment, people’s ability to defend themselves. 
The government had an extremely strong public interest 
justification, but the Seventh Circuit would have found the 
requirement was not closely fit to achieve the government’s goal. The 
requirement was extremely underinclusive and overinclusive, and the 
system in place is flawed. Further, there are other methods that may be 
more of an administrative burden but solve these problems. Therefore, 
if the Seventh Circuit in Culp applied an analysis of elevated 
intermediate scrutiny as it should have, the court would have found 
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